Stakeholders in modern UK company law by Milman, David




The concept of a “stakeholder” is now well established in the terminology of UK Company Law.  But 
it is not defined in the legislation.  The most obvious (though non explicit) manifestation of the 
concept is to be found in the complex provisions of Companies Act 2006 s. 172, but in fact it has a 
more extensive heritage.  Its true substantive lineage arguably goes back to the statutory response 
in the form of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965 to the restrictive decision of the court in Parke v 
Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 927 and indeed might be traced even as far back as the conferment of 
preferential claims status on arrears of “servants’” wages in the late 19th century by the Preferential 
Payments in Bankruptcy Acts 1888 and 1897.  Its linguistic heritage is more modern, only really 
arriving on these shores from North American management discourse for the attention of legal 
academics through the pioneering work of the late John Parkinson (see in particular his classic 
Corporate Power and Responsibility, first published by OUP in 1993, where the associated notion of 
corporate social responsibility was highlighted). 
Policymakers have taken on board the concept of the stakeholder.  Will Hutton’s works, published in 
the edited collection The Stakeholding Society (1999)(Polity Press), were influential in raising a wider 
awareness.  There is an outward manifestation in the form of the concept of Enlightened 
Shareholder Value.  A perusal of the various iterations of the Company Law Review (1998-2001) will 
testify to that.  The Final Report (URN 01/242) in para 3.8 in effect notes the need for directors to 
take account of stakeholders’ interests when exercising managerial powers.  
The purpose of this editorial is to review current developments in UK stakeholder law, paying 
particular attention to those interest groups already well identified as stakeholders in modern 
corporations. 
 
Shareholders and minority shareholders 
No one would deny the fact that a shareholder is a stakeholder in a company.  Shareholders can in 
general exercise their vote in their own economic interests.  But, in some cases, the courts have 
placed limits upon their rights – witness the reflective loss rule as an example.  Strictly speaking, a 
member of a company enjoys personal property rights in the shares held, but not in the company 
itself. That said, the concept of “shareholder primacy” is well established as the dominant 
philosophy: Hutton v West Cork Railway Co Ltd (1883) 23 Ch D 654 at 673 per Bowen LJ.  It is 
prominently embedded in the terms of s. 172(1) of Companies Act 2006 by the requirement to run 
the business in the interests of members of the company. The real problem in practice is 
determining what protective rights such a person should have when enjoying only a limited 
economic stake in firm through a minority shareholding. We note here  s.172(1)(f) and the duty of 
directors to have regard to the need to act fairly between members. 
 The main options for minority shareholder protective measures would appear to be via an unfair 
prejudice petition under s. 994 of the Companies Act 2006 or a derivative claim pursuant to Part 11 
of said Act.  The unfair prejudice option has been firmly established since the jurisdiction was 
revitalised in 1980 and is heavily dependent upon its attendant jurisprudence, with the cautionary 
decision of the House of Lords in O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 still being the dominant 
precedent.  We are still getting used to the workings of the new derivative claims procedure 
introduced via Part 11 of the Companies Act 2006.  This reversed the common law position that 
there was no right to bring such a claim unless one of the exceptions to Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 
Hare 461 could be established.  The statutory presumption now favours a derivative claim in defined 
circumstances.  But, in reality, the majority of such claims fail to surmount the judicial permission 
hurdle.  Sometimes that failure is because s. 263 compels the court to take into account whether a 
person acting in accordance with s. 172 would proceed with such a claim.  Those applicants that 
achieve leave or permission from the court to proceed with the derivative claim then have to face 
the further and major pragmatic issue of litigation costs. 
On a European level we note the Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36), as upgraded by Directive 
(2017/828).  The impact of these measures in UK Corporate Law has not been great but they do 
represent steps in the direction of further empowering shareholders. 
 
Directors 
Directors have a stake in the company under all circumstances.  That stake is both directly economic 
and can also be non-economic in nature (particularly in a family firm).  That interest may be 
increased if, as is the normal course of events, they own shares in the company and also if they are 
employees. Their managerial interest is reflected by the fact that improper exclusion from 
management may justify an unfair prejudice finding or even a winding up on the just and equitable 
ground (s. 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986).  But they are in an anomalous position because 
directors owe duties to other stakeholders when exercising corporate powers as part of their 
managerial role.  Failure to perform those duties may have personal consequences. 
 
Creditors 
The status of creditors as members of the stakeholder family is also undeniable these days.  That 
was not always so obvious – witness Mills v Northern Railway of Buenos Aires (1870) 5 Ch App 621 
where the court denied them locus standi to block ultra vires activity by the company. But we must 
remember that the concept of a creditor as stakeholder is a broad church.  Rights (and the power to 
constrain managerial discretion) differ depending on whether the creditor has security and, if so, on 
the nature of such security.  Equally, unsecured creditors may be divided up into different classes, a 
bugbear if a scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 is in contemplation.   
Building upon a common law jurisprudence developed via decisions such as West Mercia Safetywear 
v Dodd (1988) 4 BCC 30 we have a clear statutory statement of the position of creditors laid down in 
s. 172(3) of the Companies Act 2006.  This provision was further explained by John Randall QC in Re 
HLC Environmental Projects Ltd [2013] EWHC (Ch), [2014] BCC 337.  Objectivity can be used by the 
court when reviewing whether directors’ actions live up to the requirement to protect creditors. 
There are however limitations to this protection, with the main curb being that the protection only 
kicks in if the company is insolvent or nearly insolvent.  Actions carried out on behalf of a solvent 
company that threaten the interests of creditors in the long term may not be protected under s. 172.  
But s. 172(3) has been extended by the application of the general avoidance provision found in  
Insolvency Act 1986 s. 423 in cases such as  BTI  2014 LLC v Sequana SA [2016] EWHC 1686 (Ch), 
[2017] 1 BCLC 453 and  Dickinson v NAL Realisation (Staffordshire) Ltd [2017] EWHC 28 (Ch).  In BTI 
(supra) Rose J in a lengthy judgment indicated that the s. 172(3) duty arose at a time when the 
directors ought to be contemplating the future insolvency of the company either because it was on 
the verge of insolvency or there was a potential long term liability that had not been provided for.  
Neither condition was met on the facts of the case before the court.  But Rose J did indicate that the 
possibility of s. 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 coming into play was much greater because the 
statutory language of the provision was deliberately wide.  A dividend payment could be found to be 
a transaction at an undervalue within the meaning of s. 423 of the 1986 Act.  In Dickinson (supra) the 
point was again made by HHJ McKenna (following BTI) that it would be difficult to engage s. 172(3) 
where the company was solvent, but not so difficult in the case of engaging s. 423. In this case 
certain property transactions and share buybacks were under the microscope and were in part 
successfully challenged.  If this thinking becomes the norm we may be witnessing a significant 
development in upgrading directorial stewardship requirements in UK Company Law through these 
apparently obscure cases. 
The prescribed part (or reserved fund) introduced in s. 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986 via the 
Enterprise Act 2002 was an important symbolic message of support for unsecured creditors.  It has 
alleviated their predicament in some cases by top slicing realisations destined for the floating chare 
holder, but in reality we are talking about crumbs of comfort rather than a major improvement in 
the distributional position.  For a recent review of this subject see Akintola [2017] 30 Insolvency 
intelligence 55. 
A number of reforms made by the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 offer further 
assistance to unsecured creditors.  It is made clear by s. 119 (inserting s. 176ZB into the Insolvency 
Act 1986) that proceeds of certain recovery claims brought by office holders belong exclusively to 
unsecured creditors and not to the floating charge holder. The advent of the possibility of financial 
compensation under new disqualification regime (SBEEA 2015 s. 110: CDDA 1986 ss. 15A-C) may 
ultimately serve to alleviate their position.  Indeed such compensation may be directed towards 
individual creditors rather than unsecured creditors generally.  But, we must not get carried away 
with this latter provision:  claims under this provision are expected to be rare birds. 
The Law Commission in its July 2016 Report on  Consumer Prepayments on Retailer Insolvency (LC 
No. 368) may, if implemented, offer further protection to prepaying customers of failed retailers by 
offering them limited preferential creditor status. Thus prepayments made within 6 months of 
insolvency may under certain conditions be treated as preferential debts up to a maximum of £250. 
Subordinated creditors of the company have little leverage if the company runs into difficulty, 
though they may assert themselves in the distribution of assets of a concern that turns out to be 
solvent with a resultant surplus– see the Lehman “waterfall” litigation resulting in the ruling of the 
Supreme Court reported in [2017] UKSC 38. 
 
Employees and former employees 
Employees are indisputably stakeholders on any view of the modern company.  But their input of 
labour is not always as well protected as is the input of capital by shareholders and creditors.  Since 
1980 directors have been under a statutory obligation to have regard to their interests and that is 
now confirmed by s. 172(1)(b) of the Companies Act 2006. 
To complicate matters an employee may, of course, be a shareholder. This can create a curious 
relationship.  This “half way house” of employee shareholders had the potential to become more 
significant post the enactment of the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013, but that experiment was 
short lived.  Another complication lies in the fact that a director will usually be an employee and will 
probably own some shares in the company.  On the question of directors as employees it is pertinent 
to ask whether they should they enjoy the same level of protection as other employees, particularly 
with regard to the recovery of unpaid wages and rights to access state compensation funds.  This 
general question was before the court in the test case of Secretary of State for BERR v Neufeld 
[2009] EWCA Civ 280 and was answered in the affirmative.  One can understand why the court felt 
compelled to reach this conclusion, but might ask whether the issue should be reconsidered.  
We noted Parke v Daily News (supra) earlier.  It was neutralised by the introduction of the general 
redundancy scheme in 1965 and was specifically reversed by Companies Act 1980 s. 74 
(reconsolidated as Companies Act 1985 s. 719 and now located in Companies Act 2006 s. 247).  A 
similar provision is to be found in s. 187 of the Insolvency Act 1986 where a liquidator is faced with a 
surplus. It is made clear by s. 247(2) of the Companies Act 2006 that this power to make provision 
for displaced employees can override any obligations arising under s. 172.   
As a result of our current EU membership, employees enjoy consultation rights and other 
protections through the Acquired Rights Directive 1977 (as originally adopted) and the TUPE 
Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/246) (as amended). 
The controversial possibility of placing worker representatives on the board was raised by Theresa 
May shortly after she assumed office as Prime Minister, but that was watered down in the Green 
Paper of November 2016 on Corporate Governance and replaced by a suggestion that workers’ 
interests should be represented by a particular non-executive director.  The future pattern of things 
is very unclear, not least because of the state of political uncertainty in the UK.  The House of 
Commons BEIS Committee in April 2017 in Corporate Governance (HC 702) opposed the idea of 
compulsion in terms of having worker representatives on the board but favoured recruitment of 
more diverse groups as NEDs.  It also recommended the setting up of stakeholder panels consisting 
of employee and consumer representatives in order to advise directors.  We await developments 
here. 
Employee protection in Company law does not by definition extend to self-employed service 
providers, sometimes called indirect workers. These are a growing constituency in the modern 
economy.  The City Link affair underscores this and it is arguable from a perusal of the resulting 
Parliamentary report in Session 2014/15 from the DBIS Committee, Impact of the Closure of City Link 
on Employment (HC 928) (para 74) that there is an appetite to extend preferential claims protection 
to them in respect of sums due to them for labour services provided. No legislative action has been 
taken on this matter and there are concerns that it would be unwise to revert to a practice of 
reintroducing more preferential claims via the back door.   Suppliers of labour services are 
presumably covered by s. 172 and the directors should have regard to their interests.  Looking to the 
future, a lot might depend upon litigation before the courts which is currently looking at the 
boundaries between employed and self-employed “workers”. 
The focus of attention in recent times, particularly in the wake of the BHS affair, has been on the 
protection on offer to employees (past and present) in the context of the security of their 
occupational pensions. The Pension Protection Fund has raised this issue in respect of the payment 
of dividends and it may be that a more restrictive approach will be adopted in future. It is clear that 
employees are covered by the terms of s. 172, but why not add pensioners (i.e. former employees) 
to the list of parties whose interests the directors should have some regard to when performing 
their duties pursuant to s. 172? 
 
Suppliers 
The need to take into account the interests of suppliers to the company is implicit in the language 
adopted by s. 172(1)(c).  Section 172 does therefore recognise the position of suppliers when 
fostering business relationships, as it does with regard to customers and “others” (who are 
unspecified). 
Suppliers of raw materials have of course found a powerful protective tool in the form of the 
reservation of title clause, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal in the Romalpa decision [1976] 
1 WLR 676.  But retention of title has its limitations, particularly with regard to the nature of the 
supplies.  Looking beyond title retention, some suppliers are in an especially strong bargaining 
position because of limited competition and their rights have had to be restricted in the interests of 
other stakeholders.  So we have seen curbs on monopoly suppliers introduced via s. 233 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 and further strengthened by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 s. 
92 has extended the protection enjoyed by a distressed company from the cut off of essential 
supplies.  The mechanism for this change is the Insolvency (Protection of Essential Supplies) Order 
2015 (SI 2015/989).  Contractual ipso facto clauses may be overridden in cases of administration or 
company voluntary arrangement; this is achieved by the introduction of a new s. 233A into the 
Insolvency Act 1986.  This may impact upon suppliers who in the past have been able to play 
hardball with manufacturers who cannot source supplies elsewhere.  
Before leaving our discussion of the position of suppliers in the modern company context we should 
note that the company itself has new responsibilities as a result of the enactment of the Modern 
Slavery Act 2015.  This legislation imposes transparency requirements with regard to labour 
practices in supplier chains.  From a director’s perspective the linkage with the duty to have regard 
to the reputation of the firm imposed by s. 172(1)(e) should be borne in mind. 
 
The local community 
The need to have regard to the interests of the community is listed in s. 172(1)(d) in terms of the 
business operations of the company.   Presumably, business operations would include any 
downsizing of the said operations. This is one further area of commercial activity where the state 
often picks up the bill at the end of the day by requiring the establishment special regional 
investment funds and other local initiatives to address any attendant unemployment.  This brings 
corporate social responsibility into a sharp focus. 
 
The environment 
This is also mentioned in s. 172(1)(d) and for many years there has been special discrete legislation 
rendering companies and their officers liable for breaches of environmental regulation.  Where the 
state is a major investor in a company it can try to influence the directors to adopt a environmentally 
friendly policy, but the final decision must be for the directors who should have regard to the 
interests of members – on this see the comments of Sales J in R (on the application of People and 
Planet) v HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 3020 (Admin).    
 The state 
As it has the deepest of all pockets it is not surprising that it many cases it is faced with expenditure 
where a company defaults on its obligations to other stakeholders (particularly employees).  
Therefore why not add it to the s. 172 list?  An explicit recognition would be welcome in that it might 
focus the minds of certain company directors who might view the public exchequer as fair game. 
In the absence of such a change we should concede that the state already has at its disposal a range 
of protective tools.  It can refuse registration of a new company, but that is rarely done, save on 
grounds of morality.  It can seek the disqualification of those persons who are not fit to enjoy the 
facility of limited liability.  It can seek to have companies wound up in the public interest pursuant to 
s. 124A of the Insolvency Act 1986.   We note in this context the s. 172(1)(e) duty imposed on 
directors to have regard to the desirability of maintaining a high reputation for standards of business 
conduct. The latest Insolvency Service Enforcement Outcomes published in April 2017 show that 85 
companies were wound up in the public interest in 2016/17.  This is a drop of 35% on the previous 
year but is partly explained away by the use of alternative regulatory actions to deal with suspected 
abuse.  It is generally accepted that should use its powers more extensively to root out improper 
behaviour.   There is an issue of available public resources here. 
 
The problem(s) with s. 172 
Section 172 has not been an unqualified success.  Its flaws lie partly in its design as a statutory 
provision.  The use of the elastic phrase “have regard to” is derived from Companies Act 1985 s. 309.  
But it sets the barrier at a very low level requiring reflection on the part of directors rather than 
compliance with stakeholder needs.  That is inevitable unless we are prepared to fundamentally 
change our attitudes to capitalism. The list of identified stakeholders is not comprehensive, as s. 
172(1) concedes (“amongst other matters”).  This lacuna is of limited importance because none of 
the designated constituencies can, as such, enforce s. 172 directly in the courts.  Question marks 
remain about who enforces the obligations imposed by s. 172.  Presumably we are looking at the 
company or, if it fails to do so and it is solvent, a shareholder by means of a derivative claim.  If the 
company is insolvent then the office holder does the enforcing.  Critically there is no prioritisation 
between competing stakeholder interests.  Such competition is inevitable – witness Re Welfab 
Engineers Ltd [1990] BCC 600 where the court had to weigh up conflicting employee and creditor 
interests.   
These weaknesses in s. 172 have attracted official notice. On 5 April 2017 the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Business, Enterprise and Industrial Strategy published its third report of Session 
2016/17 on Corporate Governance (HC 702).  This called for a strengthening of s. 172 by urging the 
Financial Reporting Council to amend the UK Corporate Governance Code so as to require directors 
to publish a statement each year indicating how they had complied with their obligations under s. 
172.  It also suggested conferring power on the Financial Reporting Council to initiate litigation on 
the back of s. 172 in defined circumstances where persuasive action had failed to correct behaviour. 
 
Conclusion 
Clearly considerable advances have been made in recent times to put the concept of the stakeholder 
on a firmer footing in modern UK Company Law.  But the debate continues.  That discussion will be 
played out in the context of the Green Paper on Corporate Governance which was published by the 
Government on 28 November 2016.  Current political uncertainty may delay a clear outcome to that 
debate. 
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